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~-'' '"'" ' SUMMARY
Unpowered automatic approaches and landings with a CV990 aircraft
were conducted to study navigation, guidance, and control problems associated
with terminal area approach and landinq for the space shuttle. The flight
tests were designed to study from 11,300 m to touchdown the performance
of a navigation and guidance concept which utilized blended radio/inertial
navigation using VOR, DME, and ILS as the ground navigation aids. In
excess of fifty automatic approaches and landings were conducted. Pre-
liminary results indicate that this concept may provide sufficient accuracy
to accomplish automatic landing of the shuttle orbiter without air-breathing




The Space Shuttle Vehicle must be able to perform landings on a
conventional size runway in either an automatic or piloted (manual) mode.
Since the shuttle will fly and respond much like a large jet transport
aircraft during the approach and landing, a significant transfer of jet
transport autoland technology is expected. However, the SSV is in many ways
different from a large jet transport. For example, the shuttle will have
a lower maximum L/D and will be unpowered in the approach. Based on these
differences, it appeared that research was necessary to develop a technology
base for the design of the terminal navigation, guidance, and control
(GN&C) system for the SSV. This research would establish the navigation
system, guidance laws, and the guidance and control equipment and instrumentation
necessary to accomplish automatic and manual control from the end of reentry
to the ground. To meet the needs of the Space Shuttle Program the Ames
Research Center initiated plans early in the program to develop a capability
for flight test validation of SSV navigation, guidance, and control concepts.
Comprehensive analysis and ground based simulation studies of the shuttle
landing approach have been performed by Ames and its contractors (reference
1-4). Some flight tests at FRC (references 5-6) demonstrated the feasibility
of unpowered approaches and landings of low L/D vehicles under manual control,
however, no flight Work had been conducted with a completely automatic
guidance, navigation, and control system.
An exaimination of candidate aircraft suitable for the project indicated
that NASA's Convair.990 (CV990) had the capability of simulating the
orbiter lift-to-drag characteristics over the entire velocity spectrum of
interest (i.e., terminal area, final approach, and landing phases of flight).
In June 1971, a contract was signed with Sperry Flight Systems Division to
provide a digital avionics system for installation in the CV990. The
system, referred to as the Simulated Shuttle Flight Test System (SS-FTS),
was to have sufficient size, speed, and flexibility to mechanize the
unpowered navigation, guidance, and control terminal area concepts postulated
for the orbiter. The system installation and checkout in the CV990 was
completed on June 1, 1972 and flight tests were initiated on June 2, 1972.
A total of 18 flights have been conducted during three flight test periods




AGL Above Ground Level
ARC Ames Research Center
CADS Central Air Data System
CAS Calibrated Air Speed
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
EAFB Edwards Air Force Base (USAF)
FRC Flight Research Center
GSIP Glide Slope Intercept Point
G/S -ILS Glide Slope
H, h Altitude (H = -Z)
IAS Indicated Air Speed
ILS Instrument Landing System
INS Inertial Navigation System
L/D Aerodynamic Lift to Drag Ratio
LOG ILS Localizer
RCS Runway Coordinate System
RO R-Zero Circle
S/B Speed Brakes
SS-FTS Simulated Shuttle Flightiest System
SSV Space Shuttle Vehicle
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
TOL Take-Off and Landing Facility
UHF Ultra-high Frequency
VHF Very High Frequency
VOR Very High Frequency Omnirange
X Longitudinal Coordinate in RCS
Y Lateral Coordinate in RCS















The components of the avionics system installed in the CV990 are shown
on figure 1. It is an integrated digital avionics system performing all the
terminal area navigation, guidance, and control in the CV990 flight test
vehicle. It is an adaptation of the G&N system which Boeing had selected
for installation in its supersonic transport. This system provides NASA
with a flexible research facility for inflight evaluation of terminal area,
approach and landing problems of the space shuttle.
The system is capable of performing either automatic or piloted landings.
These tests have concentrated on the use of conventional radio/navigation
aids which are well understood and widely used. The system was configured
as a blended inertia! radio navigation system. An indepth discussion of
each of the system components, their function and operation is presented
in reference 7.
In order to put the flight test data in perspective, a typical trajectory
which was flown during these flight tests will be discussed, as well as
the navigation concept, the flight conditions, and the operational procedures.
Only a limited discussion of these items is presented herein. The reader
is referred to references 7 and 8 fpr more operational details and a
complete discussion of the guidance,', navigation, .and control equations.
The tests were conducted at Edwards Air Force Basis with all landings
on the 'A, 570 rv» main runway (Runway 22). !
Conventional CV990 procedures were followed during aircraft takeoff
and climb to 11,300 m. Before initiating the transition from conventional
transport to the simulated shuttle vehicle it was necessary to input data
to the system relative to the chosen landing site, the navigation aids to
be used, and the aircraft weight. This was accomplished by the pilot via
the Data Entry Panel (Keyboard) and the Status Panel (Display). The computer
requested the information via the Status Panel. The pilot entered the
appropriate response to the computer display via the Keyboard. Simulated
shuttle operation was initiated by tuning the selected radio/navigation
aids (i.e., DME,;DME/VOR) selecting the SSV switch position, pressing
the AUTO Button on the Mode Select Panel, deploying the speed brake and
landing gear and retarding the throttles to flight idle. From this point
on, the complete approach through touchdown was automatic, with the
axception of a final speed brake adjustment and flap deployment during the
last stages of the approach.
Figures 2a and 2b show a typical approach trajectory and indicates
the guidance and navigation concepts implemented for each of the phases
of the approach from 11,300 »r» to touchdown.
The energy management phase was designed to align; the vehicle with the
runway heading at the top of the two-segment approach path with sufficient
energy to insure^an ability to reach the runway. The maneuver is based on
a fixed, imaginary vertical cylinder (called the R-Zero circle) which was
about eight nautical miles in diameter with its axis On an extension of
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the runway centerline. Regardless of the direction of the initial approach,
the descending vehicle was first aligned with a tangent to the R-Zero circle
in order to transition in a clock-wise path around the circle. The aircraft
glided at a near maximum L/D condition (maximum for the simulated shuttle)
at about 230 knots (IAS) to the circle and spiraled clock-wise around it
until it acquired the outbound raidal which was also tangent to the R-Zero
circle. It proceeded outbound along this radial for a distance which was
continuously being computed to determine when the aircraft should start
the procedure turn inbound to intercept the steep glide slope segment of
the two-segment approach path at an altitude above 6,100 m.
Navigation during the energy management phase was performed with the
two DME stations (Lake Hughes and George Air Force Base) and the barometric
altimeter. The onboard system used these available measurements combined
in the computer with the respective inertial velocity components from the
INS to give the components of the position estimates.
At approximately 6,100 m , the vehicle intercepted the runway center-
line plane, captured the ILS localizer and pitched over to fly the steep
glide slope phase. It continued down the steep portion as the velocity
increased to a nominal 305 knots (IAS). The rate of descent on the steep
glide slope was about 1,830 m .per minute, the L/D about five (5).
Navigation during the steep glide slope phase was performed with a single
DME station (Lake Hughes), the ILS localizer, and the barometric altimeter.
At about 762. m (AGL), a final speed brake adjustment was annunciated
on the Status Panel and made by the pilot. The L/D dropped to approximately
4.5, then gradually increased as the velocity decreased during first flare.
The first flare was initiated at about 420 m (AGL) when the ILS
glide slope beam was intercepted. The system captured the ILS glide slope
.as the aircraft flared to the shallow leg of the approach. The rate of
descent was arrested from I,83O YV\ per minute to about 5SO m per
minute just after first flare and decreased to about 274 m per minute
prior to final flare.
Navigation during the shallow glide slope phase was performed with
the ILS localizer and glide slope signals and the barometric altimeter.
At approximately 245 knots on the shallow glide slope, the Status
Panel displayed the command to the pilot for flaps equal to 10°. With the
airspeed and altitude continuing to decrease, the system was programmed
to initiate final flare when the height above the runway was about
18 rn. At 2.B m above the runway, a decrab maneuver was performed
to align the aircraft with the centerline of the runway. Touchdown occurred
nominally at 175 knots airspeed with about 0.6 rn per second rate of
.descent. .The system was disconnected by the pilot at touchdown. Automatic
roll-out and braking was not provided.
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The approach just described could be flown in an automatic mode or in
a manual mode using the side arm controller or the normal aircraft yoke.
During manual operation, the pilot centered the flight director needles
in order to fly the profile.
Figure 3 shows the CV990 aircraft during the steep glide slope portion
of a simulated shuttle approach.
Ground tracking data was obtained from the Flight Research Center MPS19
radar for the high altitude portion of the flight; from a mobile tracking
radar located near the touchdown point for the final approach and landing
phase; and from the Air Force tracking cinetheodolite stations located
along the runway for obtaining precise touchdown data.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The SS-FTS system was functionally tested in both the automatic and
the manual flight director mode. Insufficient data was obtained to evaluate
the manual mode of operation, thus this report will deal only with the
results obtained from the automatic mode of operation. Many automatic
approaches and landings were conducted during the course of the test
series. An acceptable or optimal set of system gains was not established
until part way through the third test period. The data which is presented
is from a set of 36 automatic approaches and landings conducted during the
latter stages of the third test period, during which time the system gains
were invariant.
The performance data .is divided into two broad categories (T) guidance
performance and (2) navigation performance. Within each category the data
is presented at selected positions (windows) along the flight trajectory.
The systems performance as measured at these selected positions is presented
in the form of Y-Z plots, time histories, histograms, and trajectory plots,
etc. A definition of the coordinate system, the "windows", and a definition
of the guidance and navigation errors precedes the presentation of the
data.
Geometry
Coordinate System - All data presented in this report is referenced
to a right-hand Cartesian coordinate system with the origin on the center-
line of runway 22 (Edwards Air Force Base), at the ILS Glide Slope intersection
point (GSIP). The X-axis is positive along the runway center!ine in a
southwesterly direction, the Y-axis is positive in a northwesterly direction
perpendicular to the X-axis, and Z-axis is positive downward and perpendicular
to the X and Y axis. The X and Y-axes are in a plane tangent to the earth
at the origin. This coordinate system is known as the Runway Coordinate
System (RCS). A graphical description of "the RCS is presented in figure 4.
Windows - The location of the three windows for which system performance
data will be presented is shown in figure 4. These windows, which are located
on an extention of the runway centerline (X-axis) are; (1) the steep glide
slope capture window located at X = - 3*1,200 mn (H ~ £>,IOO ™ );
(2) the first, flare window located at X = -7,I6O m (h = 1-57 m ),
and (3) the final flare window located at X = -487 m (h = Zl . 'Vm ).
Definition of the Guidance and Navigation Error - The terms "navigation
error" and "guidance error" will be used repeatedly in the discussion of
system performance. These terms will be defined with the aid of the graphical
representation shown in figure 5. The figure shows a ground plane projection
of the "actual" reference trajectory which is geometrically referenced to
the RCS origin (GSIP) and the "estimated" reference trajectory which is
computed by the onboard system. The disagreement between the "estimated"
and "actual" reference trajectory is due to measurement errors (bias and
random noise)'in the radio/inertial navigation system.
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The actual position of the aircraft at any time, was determined by
ground-base tracking radar and differed from the position estimated by the
onboard system by the, magnitude of the navigation error. In.other words,,
the navigation error is defined as the time correlated difference between
the radar measurement of aircraft position, and the onboard estimate of
•position. Analyticaly, this error is expressed a's:
•^ -*- -*" -*• ^ ^
e = (X - X } + (Y - Y ) + (H - H }EN l*R Aest ; UR Yest ; <HR HestJ
The guidance.error was determined solely from data computed onboard
the aircraft. An estimate was made for both the position of the aircraft
and the position of the reference trajectory. The guidance error is defined
as the time correlated difference between these two estimates. Analyticaly,
\this error is expressed as:
_k- -X. • -X. .X _*. ' ' *\.
fi * PCi* Y*f*f P^f" K*P"f PQf"U CO U 1C) CO U I C I CO 1*
The onboard system controlled the aircraft to reduce the guidance error but
could not act upon the navigation error since the system was unaware of
its existance.
Guidance Performance
For the 36 automatic approaches and landings of the CV990 simulated
shuttle vehicle (reported herein) eight of the runs were initiated from
approximately 11,300 m altitude, the remaining 28 runs from 7,620 m.
Those trajectories starting at the lower altitude, omit the so-called
energy management portion and intiate the approach in a direction inbound
to the runway (straight-in-approach).
Energy Management Phase - Runs initiated from 11,300 w, may start
at different positions within the "cardioid shaped" energy window. Two
examples of these runs are designated as flight patterns E and H for
convenient reference and are shown pictorially in figures 6a and 6b.
Presented in the top half of each figure is the down-range - cross-
range (X versus V) plot of aircraft position and in the lower part of the
figure, the corresponding altitude-down-range (H versus X) plot. Each
figure shows two paths; the segmented line represents the reference path or
nominal trajectory of the aircraft as computed by the onboard guidance
program and the continuous line represents the position of the aircraft
as estimated by the onboard system. As previously noted, the time correlated
difference between these two paths is the guidance error of the system.
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Pattern E - Figure 6a shows the approach profile for a Pattern E.
The approach was initialized south of the runway centerline, well within
the energy window with the aircraft heading north and closing on the R-Zero
circle. The aircraft acquired the R-Zero circle just prior to crossing the
extension of the runway centerline, banked right and tracked the R-Zero
circle. About 50 seconds later, the aircraft acquired the outbound radial
and tracked outbound for about 15 seconds. The final or procedure turn was
initiated when the predicted altitude loss during the turn would' result
in interception of the steep glide slope at approximately 6,100 <v..
The control system initally commanded a 35° bank angle, but this bank command
rapidly increased to the bank angle limit of 45° as the ground speed increased
during the turn due to the 40 knot cross-wind. The bank angle constraint
restricted the aircraft from following the reference path. 'The aircraft
drifted to the left of the path but recovered during the latter part of
the turn as the aircraft headed into the wind. The turn was completed
at about 1,02O yv> altitude with the steep glide slope acquired slightly
above 6,100 m
 %
During the initial run-in to the R-Zero circle the guidance error was
quite small. As previously noted, during the final turn maneuver the
guidance error became more pronounced as the aircraft was consistently
drifting to the left of the reference path. The maximum guidance error
during the approach occurred about half way through the final turn and
was 1,585 m.
Pattern H - Figure 6b illustrates a trajectory in which the system was
effectively initialized outside the energy window even though this fact
was not immediately apparent. The approach was initialized north of the
runway centerline and appeared to be within the energy window but quite
close to the boundry. The onboard estimate of the aircraft position was
displaced from the actual initiation point (from radar) by about 1-1/2 nautical
miles. This discrepency, due to the INS drifts, is not significant as
long as the aircraft is still within the window. However, in this case
the aircraft was off in heading by 30° to the right and low on initial velocity
(M = .80), which placed it, in essence, outside the energy window. After
the navigation system was updated via the radio navigation aids (DME-DME), the
aircraft.corrected the position estimate and heading error, started closing
the range to the R-Zero circle and acquired the circle about half a minute
later. The R-Zero circle was tracked for about 2-1/2 minutes with the aircraft
flying close to maximum L/D, descending at I,Z20 m /minute. At the
intercept of the outbound radial a low altitude (energy) condition existed.
The system therefore omitted the outbound radial phase; immediately proceeded
into the final turn, and attempted to make a minimum radius turn. During
the turn the aircraft dirfted left of the desired path due to the winds and
the limited bank angle authority. For the entire approach, the aircraft
altitude was lower than desired and at completion of the final turn the
aircraft was 1,500 feet below the steep glide slope. Flying at
maximum L/D, the aircraft finally intercepted and captured the steep glide
slope at an altitude of 5,340 m» This indicates .that the initial con-
dition constraints were violated since capture should nominally occur above
6JOO w. . , '
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6uidance Error at Steep Glide Slope Capture Window - The guidance
errors at the steep glide slope window (X = -3^200
 fm t h - 6,100 m )
for all of the high altitude runs are, shown in figure 7. At this
window location,, the guidance error is zero if the aircraft is on the computed
runway centerline and on the computed steep glide slope beam at 6,1OO ™
above ground level. The four runs which show large negative vertical
errors in figure 7 are those in which the aircraft began with low energy
and had not captured the steep glide slope at or above 6,100 m . In
these runs, identified by a vertical dash above the data point, the pitch
guidance was still in.the high altitude energy management mode. Consequently,
the system did not try to zero the guidance error directly but rather held
the aircraft to a near maximum L/D until it penetrated the steep glide slope
at an altitude below 6,100 vn . The remaining runs shown in figure 7
are those where capture of the steep glide slope occurred at or above
6,loo m. In these cases, the pitch guidance is in the steep glide
slope tracking mode and as a result, the vertical guidance errors are
relatively small.
The large lateral errors shown in the figure (i.e., flight 3 circle
symbol) results from the limited bank angle authority with the accompaning
inability to correct for the effects of high altitude winds.
The data point corresponding to patterns E and H (discussed in the
previous section) are designated as flight 7 and 5 respectively in this
figure.
Steep Glide Slope Tracking - Shown in figure 8 is a time history of
the tracking performance of the system during the steep glide slope phase
of the approach. The envelopes of maximum vehicle excursions for the series
of automatic approaches are shown as the shaded regions in the figure.
The vertical tracking error relative to the 10° glide slope is shown in
the upper part of the figure. The lateral tracking error relative to the
center of the ILS localizer signal is shown in the lower part of the figure.
A solid trace within the shaded region is a time history of vertical and
lateral guidance errors for one specific run which is considered to be an
example of "good tracking performance". It is significant to note that at
steep glide slope capture, the lateral guidance errors may be larger than
11.5 m but that these errors converged to relatively, small values (<2a< m )
prior to first flare.
Guidance Error at First Flare Window - Figure 9 illustrates the
guidance error measured at the first flare window (X = -.7,160 m,
H = ''VSl «v> ). The reference in this case is the center of the ILS
localizer signal and the center of the steep glide slope as computed by the
navigation equations using a single DME and the baro-altimeter. If the guidance
errors were zero, the data points would be clustered on the estimated
glide slope centerline which is the origin of the graph.
For these data, the vertical mean error is zero with the lateral mean
error 3.1 m to7the left. The one-sigma error about the mean is +6.1 rr\
in the vertical direction and +<\.2.rr> in the lateral direction.
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First Flare Altitude - The altitude at which the first flare occurred
is presented in figure 10. The data is presented in the form of a histogram;
that is, the height of the vertical bar-indicates the number of times the
aircraft initiated the flare maneuver within a given altitude zone. Each
altitude zone is 6.1 -m in height. Nominally the aircraft would initiate
first flare at a point .97° above the center of the 2.5° glide slope beam.
This corresponded to an altitude of 426 m above the ground. The data
indicated that the mean flare initiation altitude was 441 YYI .above
the ground (a bias of + 1^ .3 w>) with a one-sigma dispersion of +10.4 m
These errors could be attributed to either the ILS ground transmitter or.
the airborne receiver. In terms of the ground transmitted ILS glide slope
beam parameters, the errors correspond to a beam bias of +.08° (i.e., beam
angle = 2.58° rather than 2.50°) and a random error of +.05°. From a
separate analysis of the Edwards Air Force Base ILS beam characteristic
(unpublished) it was found that the day to day variation of the glide slope
beam elevation angle could be as large as +0.2°.
Another possible source of error was from the airborne glide slope
receiver. In terms of the parameters for the receiver, the errors (Hu-
and o,,) correspond to a six millivolt bais and +4 millivolt random noise.
These receiver errors are well in excess of the'manufacturers performance
specification for this equipment. Thus it is tentatively concluded that
the inaccuracies in flare initiation altitude were most probably due to
vairation in the transmitted ILS beam rather than problems with the receivers.
Further investigation of this problem is planned.
Speed Control - Figure 11 shows examples of the speed variation during
.the appraoch from 11,300 w\ to touchdown. The aircraft velocity was
not controlled directly but tended to converge to a constant calibrated
airspeed depending upon the flight path angle (or L/D). From initiation
of the approach until steep glide slope capture the aircraft was controlled
to fly in the operational L/D mode (energy management). The L/D was
essentially constant at the value slightly less than the maximum L/D for
the shuttle. The aircraft pitch attitude was controlled to maintain this L/D.
During the descent the velocity remains constant at about 230 knots (CAS)
until steep glide slope capture. Figure 11 shows this effect for the three
approaches with the exception that the velocity for pattern H decayed by
about 20 knots just prior to steep glide slope capture. It will be remembered
that pattern H was the low energy approach discussed previously (figure 6b).
The decrease in velocity occurred as the system pitched the aircraft up to
the maximum L/D (maximum for the simulated shuttle) to decrease the rate
of descent and stretch the path length.
At steep glide slope, capture the simulated shuttle pitched over to fly
a -10° glide path. The velocities for each trajectory should converge toward
305 knots.
As previously noted, the speed brakes are deployed at the beginning
of the run to yield a desired L/D. The speed brake setting was different
for each approach and was chosen to compensate for changes in the aircraft
weight. The compensation was rather coarse with incremental 5° changes in
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speed brake for each 9,060 kilo9rai* change in aircraft weight. A 5° error
in the speed brake setting can result in an error as large as 15 knots
(CAS) in the equilibrium velocity.
This speed brake law gives acceptable results. However, a refined
speed brake deployment technique based on stored nominal velocity profile
and modulated speed brakes could converge all velocities at first flare and
landing to within a very narrow dispersion, but this must await additional
refinements to the system software and vehicle hardware.
Using the simple speed law presently implemented, the velocity dispersions
(la) at first flare were about 10 knots. This is shown in figure 12.
The velocity dispersion data at first flare are in the form of a
histogram of velocities versus number of occurrances. The figure shows
that the mean velocity for 36 approaches was 290 knots (CAS) with a one-
'sigma dispersion of +10 knots.
The final speed brake adjustment (see figure 11) was made just prior
to first flare (- ;16O *>o ) in order to compensate for atmospheric winds
and error in setting the configuration L/D. This setting was a function
of the existing atmospheric winds as measured by the onboard INS. No
further speed brake adjustments were made during the remainder of the approach
to touchdown. Velocity dispersions at final flare and landing are presented
later.
Shallow Glide Slope Tracking - The guidance system performance during
the first flare and shallow glide slope modes is shown in both the vertical
and horizontal plane in figure 13. The three flight paths are from three
landing approaches two of which represent the maximum excursions about the
ILS glide slope beam while the third represents a more nominal path. The
dispersions are caused primarily by the variation in first flare initiation
altitude. As previously noted, the flare mode was engaged when the aircraft
descended to a point that was 0.97° above the ILS glide slope. Since
the ILS receiver signal was used directly to measure this displacement, the
flare initiation altitude varied as a function of the noise on the signal.
Variation of +0.2° were detected in the glide slope beam deflection. The
first flare began at about 1-6.3 m above the ground for the upper path in
figure 13, at about 43.1 m above the ground for the middle path, and
at about 41.5 *\i above the ground for the lower path.
The variation in the first flare mode performance affected only the
initial tracking performance of the shallow glide slope mode. The vertical
errors from the ILS glide slope beam after shallow glide slope mode en-
gagement were reduced to less than 7.6m at an altitude of I2Z m .
Tracking errors below this altitude were quite small.
In the horizontal plane, the runway centerline tracking mode was a
continuation of the same guidance mode used during the steep glide slope
made. During this mode, the lateral guidance error decreased as the air-
craft approached the runway. This reduction is also apparent in comparing
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the lateral guidance error at the first flare and final flare windows,
figures 18 and 23, where the standard deviation of the error reduced from
^.15 w> to 3.^6™ The primary cause for this effect was the error in
the lateral position estimate. The noise in the lateral position estimate
was proportional to the product of the localizer beam angular noise and
the aircraft distance from the localizer antenna. If the noise on the
angular beam had a constant amplitude, then the lateral position estimate
error would decrease as the aircraft approached the runway. The ratio of
the distance from the aircraft to the localizer antenna at the final
flare window to that of the first flare window is 0.44 and the ratio of
the lateral error standard deviation at the final flare window to that at
the first flare window is 0.37. Hence, the change in distance accounts
for a substantial part of the lateral guidance error reduction. Thus, the
resulting lateral error is consistant with the idea of a constant noise
on the localizer beam.
Guidance Errors at Final Flare Window - Figure 14 shows the system
guidance performance at the final flare window. The nominal path was
the center the ILS localizer beam and the ILS glide slope beam at a distance
of 4S1 ™ down-range from the touchdown point. The nominal aircraft
altitude was 2\.4 w> AGL.
A mean of the vertical error shown in the figure is 2,1 m above
the glide slope centerline. The standard deviation of the vertical error
is +2.5 w). One probable reason for the aircraft to be consistently above
the'glide slope could be the effect of the close proximity of the ground
plane (i.e., ground effect) which tends to increase the effective lift,
arrest the sink rate, and drive the aircraft above the glide slope. This
tendency to float above the glide slope prior to final flare was observed
in the tracking data and is verified by the guidance errors presented
in figure 14. A more precise model of the aircraft ground effect could
provide information for optimizing the system gains and improving the
performance in this region. The CV990 entered the ground effect at about
37 *n above the ground. The effect (on lift) increased in an exponential
manner as the aircraft approached the ground.
The mean of the lateral guidance error was zero, which means that on
the average the aircraft was tracking the center of the ILS localizer beam.
The standard deviation was + 3.B ^
Final Flare Initiation - Flare initiation should occur when the
altitude above the ground equals S.2. ^ plus twice the altitude rate
(i.e., H =^.2+2 H). Figure 15 maps the final flare points in the H versus
H phase plane. Nominally the aircraft would be descending at about ^.5
m per second at final flare initiation at IS.Srn altitude. The mean
altitude and altitude rate from these data is IT.lrn and H. I ^ per
second respectively. The standard deviation of the data is shown in the
.form of a la dispersion ellipse. This is represented by the shaded area
in the figure.
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Position Dispersions at Touchdown - Figure 16 presents the position
dispersions of the aircraft at touchdown. The data are presented as
histograms; with the height of a given vertical bar indicating the number
of times the aircraft touched down in a given zone on the runway. Distance
along the centerline of the runway is divided into zones at each 64.T «^>
interval. For example, the aircraft touched down seven times in the zone
which lay between the 2&.2m and 30& m position along the runway.
The zero position is the glide slope intercept point (GSIP) on the runway.
These data are from 36 automatic landings. The mean touchdown point was
305 oo beyond the glide slope intercept point with a three-sigma'
dispersion of 451 y^ ; or in other words, approximately 99% of the landings
were contained within a zone ^S7 m in length. For comparison with these
flight data, the FAA Category II three-sigma criteria for distribution of
touchdown for commercial transports is shown as the shaded zone. As can
be seen, the touchdowns were well within the limits which have been spelled
out in FAA advisory circular No. 20-57A (reference 9), for certification
of automatic landing systems on conventional jet transports, wherein they
specify a three-sigma value of 685 m.
Across the runway dispersions, or lateral dispersions, are depicted
in the figure on the right. The data again is presented as a histogram.
The runway centerline is taken as zero. Zones across runway are defined
at 1.5 ** intervals. The three-sigma dispersion was +11.9 wv. compared
with the FAA criteria of +13.T m« This lateral dispersion data needs
some qualification in that the centerline of the 'ILS localizer beam at
Edwards was biased to the right side of the runway centerline. The localizer
offset has been removed from the lateral dispersion data to give a more
realistic picture of the system performance with a true Category II ILS. The
magnitude of the ILS bias will be evident in the data to be presented
showing navigation errors at the first flare and final flare windows.
Speed Dispersion at Touchdown - The histograms of vertical speed
calibrated or indicated airspeed, and ground speed at touchdown are shown
in figure 17. Plotted is the magnitude of the parameter versus the number
of occurrences.
The design vertical speed at touchdown was o. £> w^ per second. A
mean vertical speed of o.s r*\ per second was obtained during the flight
tests. This difference is not considered significant.
The system was designed to achieve a calibrated airspeed (CAS) at
touchdown of 175 +25 knots. The guidance system has indirect (open loop)
control of the CAS through an adjustment of the speed brake at first flare.
From the flight test, the .data shows a mean of 166 knots and a range of
'+24 knots (a = +9 knots).. As would be expected, the ground speed at
touchdown exhibited a larger dispersion since it was not controlled and was
dependent on the local wind conditions. The data shows this larger
dispersion with a = +16 knots. The mean value for the ground speed v/as
175 knots. Even though the touchdown groundspeeds were as high as 210 knots,
no piloting'problems were encountered.
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The ground winds during these flights varied from a low of zero to
a high during one approach of.30 knots, but characteristically the winds
were low (> 10 knots).
Navigation Performance
The onboard navigation system uses the available measurement from radio-
navigation aids (DME, VOR, ILS) and from onboard measurements (INS, Baro.,
and radio altimeter) to provide an estimate of the present aircraft position
and velocity. Ground based measurements (MPS19 tracking radar) of the
aircraft position and velocity were made directly for system performance
evaluation. Choosing the radar measurements to be the standard (indicating
the actual aircraft position) then the onboard measurement may be compared
with it to determine the performance of the onboard system. Navigation
.system performance data is presented and discussed for each of the three
'navigation windows (steep glide slope capture, first flare, and final
flare). In addition, a trajectory plot and corresponding time histories
of navigation errors are presented for one example of a high altitude
approach from H,30O m to touchdown.
Energy Management Phase - The trajectory of the aircraft during the
energy management phase and continuing until touchdown is presented in
figure 18a. The top half of the figure shows the plot of down-range - cross-
range position of the aircraft as estimated by the onboard system and as
measured by the ground base tracking radar. The lower half of the figure
presents the corresponding altitude down-range plot. The time correlated
difference between the two trajectories is the navigation error of the
onboard system. The time histories of these navigation errors are presented
in figure 18b.
The navigation system was initialized on INS only. At this time,
(figure 18a), the estimated aircraft position was at the point indicated
by a circle. 'The ground radar shows that the aircraft was actually about
1-1/2 miles to the west of this point. As the radio navaid information
(DME-DME) was introduced, the system updated the position estimate. The
onboard position estimate improved over the next 20 seconds until it
agreed quite closely with the position as determined by the radar. As the
aircraft proceeded on the approach, .it is noted that the estimated trajectory
was dispTaced slightly to the northwest of the radar measured trajectory.
This displacement could result from a bias in the slant range measurement
to the DME stations, an error in the designated location of these stations,
or a bias in the DME transmitter/receiver. With the data available it was
not possible to isolate the source of the error.
The altitude range plot also shows a discrepency between the radar
measured altitude and the onboard estimate of altitude. It was suspected
•that this discrepency was due to errors in the baro-altimeter. Heather
balloon data collected for the day of this flight showed the barometric
altitude correction to be about 305 w\ ; for the altitude range between
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%|50 and 12,200 ro . The barometric correction below %.15O w» decreases
linearily to about 36 w\ at ground level. The correction correlated
directly with the altitude error throughout the approach. This will be shown
in the time history plots.
Shown in figure 18b is a time history of the navigation errors from
initialization through to touchdown. Presented is the difference between
the onboard estimate of position (X . , Y . , H . ) and the MPS19 ground
radar measurement of position XR, YR, HR) as a function of time. The times
at which significant events occurred are Tabled for convenient cross ref-
erence with the preceding trajectory figure. The total navigation error
shown in these traces is a combined effect of errors due to ground navaid/
airborne receiver signal bias; off nominal atmosphere effects; possible time
skews between airborne and ground data as well as the basic navigation
system errors resulting from software/hardware mechanization.
A rather large perturbation in the X error is apparent following first
flare. This error occurs as the system switches modes and the onboard
position estimate changes from a dependence on DME-LOC-Baro to a dependence
on ILS G/S-LOC-Baro. The fact the X did not go to zero at touchdown
is not significant since the computer terminated computation of X estimate
when the aircraft over flew the GSIP. This event occurred about five
seconds prior to touchdown for the example shown here.
The time history of the Y error shows errors as large as
during the early portion of the approach but these decreased after steep
glide slope capture to less than Gl m . At touchdown the Y appears
to be about 61 w. Actually, the aircraft touched down within 4. 6 m
of the runway centerline as determined by the TOL facility, onboard cameras
and the Bell Radar Tracking Data. The onboard navigation estimate agreed
with these measurements. The only explanation is that the MPS19 radar.
data exhibited a bias for this run. For other approaches the radar data
did not exhibit biases of this magnitude.
The time history of the altitude error (H ) shows errors as large
as 2H m during the initial or high altitude phase of the approach.
These are reduced to essentially zero at touchdown. Altitude errors of this
magnitude occurred during several of the high altitude approaches and appeared
to be attributed to a non-standard atmosphere. For example, during flights
on days where the air was warmer than the standard atmosphere, the pressure
altimeter read low in comparison with the geometric altitude (from radar
track). For -the flight shown in figure 18b, a balloon launched radiosond
acquired atmospheric data. The dashed line in the figure shows the difference
between the pressure altitude and the geometric altitude as. determined from
the radar tracked radiosond. The altitude error time history correlates
.closely with radiosond data. The real-time altitude estimate could be
improved by measuring the static air temperature and. compensating within
the navigation filter.
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Navigation Error at Steep Glide Slope Capture - Figure 19 shows the
navigation error at the steep glide slope window; (X =. - 3%200r»»H - 6,100
no ). Here the aircraft normally was on the runway centerlirie extension.
The system was navigating in the DME/DME mode. In this mode the standard'
deviation of the total position measurement error (vector sum of X ,
Y , and H ) as determined from analysis of the raw DME signals and
barb-altimeter signal is 4-5T m . The navigation system, incorporating
inertial blending, reduced this error to a standard deviation of + ^  m
for the data shown in this figure. The biases in lateral error of
- <U wi were the result of either biases in the onboard navigation receivers
or uncertainty in the location of the VOR/DME stations. The VOR/DME
locations were obtained from the "IFR-SUPPLEMENT, UNITED STATES EFFECTIVE
9 DEC 1971 TO 1 JAN 1972" which lists such locations to an accuracy of one
second of arc (= 3O mo ). The bias in the altitude error was + 17.5 m
and can be accounted for predominately as the effect of non-standard atmospheric
.conditions.
Navigation Error at First Flare Window - Figure 20 shows the difference
between the ground measured aircraft position (radar) and the onboard
aircraft position estimate as the aircraft passed through a window positioned
at the initiation of first flare. The aircraft was nominally at an altitude
of 457 *v^ AGL, on the steep glide slope, and on the runway centerline
extension, T,i6O yrt : down-range from the RCS origin. The navigation system
was in the DME/localizer mode.
The data shows that the aircraft'was off to the right of the runway
centerline extension for all runs and below the glide slope for all but
one run. This consistent offset was due to the fact that the ILS localizer
beam bends to the right of the runway. The beam position was measured at
the touchdown point on a daily basis during the flight test and its position '
was found to be to the right of the runway centerline.
Previous analytical studies showed that the standard deviation of the
total expected measurement error (one DME range, ILS localizer deviation,
baro-altimeter) at this location is IO7 w-\ , The standard deviation
of the total navigation error from the data presented here is 16.a m.
It is interesting to note that the data fell into distinct groups.
For example, the data group which fell to the far right was collected
during a series of runs made on a single day (Flight 6). These data, as
well as previous qualitative observation of the ILS beam, show that
the ILS localizer beam is not stable. The centerline of the ILS beam
drifted significantly from day to day, with the "far right" data group
collected on the day when'the ILS drift was at its extreme.
Navigation Error at Final Flare Window - The navigation error at final
flare is illustrated in figure 21. The aircraft was nominally at an altitude
of 21.^ m AGL, on the ILS glide slope beam and on the runway centerline.
The navigation system was in the localizer/glide slope mode.
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The data in this figure show the previously discussed localizer
offset, (i.e., localizer beam is offset to the right). Analytical studies
have shown that the standard deviation of the total expected error in the
measurement at this location is 12. m . The standard deviation of the
totalnavigation error for the flight data shown here is 5.2. ro
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Conventional ground navigation aids (DME/VOR, ILS) blended with
barometric and inertial data are sufficiently accurate to
automatically land the simulated shuttle vehicle with three-
sigma touchdown dispersions of +^51 m longitudinally and
+ \\.<\ m laterally. This implies thaVair breathing engines are
not required for automatic landings of the space shuttle
vehicle.
2. The DME/DME-Baro-altimeter navigation concept for high altitude
energy management had a total position accuracy of +S^ m
(la) at an altitude of 6,100 w^.
*3. The low altitude guidance concept converged large vertical and
lateral guidance errors at an altitude of 6,100 m to errors
with a standard deviation of +E.5 ™ vertically and + 3.5 m
laterally at an altitude of 2U4 m.
4. No piloting problems were encountered'with touchdown ground
speeds as high as 210 knots.
5. The CV990 simulated shuttle program has demonstrated the oper-
ation, dependability, and inherent flexibility of a programmable
digital flight computer for guidance, navigation, and control
of the space shuttle in the terminal area approach and landing
phases of flight.
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Figure 21. - Navigation Errors at Final Flare Window
